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IN the current volume* of the Proceedings Dr. Hobson has criticized
the views of Prof. Konigt and myself + on entities which can be specified
in finite terms : I propose to say something in answer to his objections,
which to my mind are not conclusive.
The question § is as to the validity of the distinction between things
that can be finitely defined and those that cannot. Naturally no example
of the latter kind can be produced. There is a similar question as to
the distinction between those aggregates which can and those which
cannot be arranged in type w by a finite set of rules, even when it is
possible to prove the cardinal number in the second case to be neither
less nor greater than N0. An example of this second category is supplied
by the aggregate of all real numbers capable of finite specification,
according to my view of the inference to be drawn from Hobson's
argument on p. 24.
The passage in question gives a construction for a number N. This
construction assumes the existence of a set of rules, say B, by which all
adequate definitions of numbers are arranged in the type w. The rules
B are a part of the definition of N, and, if they cannot be stated in finite
terms, then N is not finitely specified ; so that the contradiction is solved.
For instance, if we take the letters and other symbols in a word, phrase,
sentence, or chapter to be digits in a scale and arrange all the integers
represented in that scale in ascending order of magnitude, it seems at
first that we have all possible finite specifications of numbers arranged
in type w, by simply rejecting from the list all words, phrases, &c,
which do not purport to specify numbers, or which specify numbers
already placed, or which give impossible specifications. Hobson's speci-
fication of N offers itself for a place in the list when its turn comes;
* Above, pp. 21-28.
+
 Math. A>imlen, Vol. LXI.
X Above, pp. 18—20.
§ It ia pervaded by the difficulty of disentangling the things we apprehend from the incano
by which we apprehend them.
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suppose the first n—1 places to be already filled. Then the first ?t—1
decimal places in N give no trouble, but when we come to the n-th
decimal place we are to fill it with a digit an, such that
an = an+{— l)a".
This is impossible, and hence the specification is to be rejected. If, how-
ever, it is rejected, it ceases to be impossible, and hence I conclude that
the proposed principle does not enable us to arrange in type w all the
numbers that can be described in finite terms. Similarly for any other
principle that can be stated in finite terms: in fact, " this ordering of the
definitions could " not " be " actually " carried out" (Hobson, p. 23), and
for that reason I did not say that the cardinal number of the numbers
in question was equal to N0, but only that it was neither less nor
greater.*
The same answer applies to Hobson's repetition of the argument on
p. 25, and, in fact, the finiteness of a specification is not impaired by
the use of series of parameters whose law of construction has been
already given in finite terms; this is, in fact, what Hobson says on p. 26.
The finiteness of which I take account is not in the process of construction,
but in the statement of the distinguishing properties of the number,
which may consist of a law for its construction or may not. For in-
stance, " the greatest integer whose English name contains only three
letters " is adequately defined, although not as simply as it might be.
There must always be a basis of definition in a stock of ideas, them-
selves indefinable for the most part, common to the giver and receiver
of the definition. " Finitely defined" must be understood to mean
"finitely defined on some particular basis" or "on the usual basis," and
the statement of such basis is, as we know, one of the most difficult of
problems.
Hobson says that the aggregate of adequately defined numbers is
* It may be said that the proof of Bernstein's theorem (Borel, Tkeorie dea Fonctions, 1898,
pp. 104-6) states in finite terms a method by which any aggregate having such a cardinal
number can be arranged in type «. Bernstein's method, however, applies to aggregates that are
already defined before the problem of ordering them is attacked; so that the solution of the
problem does not affect the actual membership of the aggregates in question. In our case the
constitution of the aggregate cannot be decided apart from the ordering, and the problem is not
fairly stated unless it is made clear that the unknowns to be found include not only the rule of
order, but also in part the actual membership of the aggregate. Compare the case of an algebraic
equation : the method by which one can solve an equation x2 + ax + b = 0 when a, b are constants
does not apply when they are functions of x.
The same difficulty arises if we apply Bernstein's theorem to the finitely specified numbers
of the second class (see above, p. 20 ; Borel, op. cit., pp. 121-2 ; G-. Cantor, Math. Ann., Vol. XLIX.,
p. 227, Theorem D).
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perfect (p. 27). Now a perfect aggregate is one that coincides with its
derivative. The derivative is the aggregate of limits of convergent
sequences of members of the original aggregate. If we are only to
take account of sequences formed by adequately defined laws, then no
doubt the aggregate of adequately denned numbers is perfect; but the
restriction begs the question. The proof (p. 18) that the number of
adequate definitions does not exceed N0 is not directly met by Hobson,
and, if it is not refuted, we have the deduction that the continuum
according to him has a cardinal number not greater than N0.
As to the question of lawless decimals, we have, I think, as much
right to postulate numbers represented by them as we have to " take "
arbitrary points on a line in geometry, and it is not possible to go far
without " taking " at least two. If two, why not three ? Then, if three
points A, B, C are taken, the ratio AB/AC defines a number and fixes a
law for a decimal which before was lawless. The difficulty of specifying
the point taken is just as great with the first or second as with the
third, and it arises even in the definition of a statute yard, which is
the distance between two points whose position has not been, and can-
not be, adequately defined from the theoretical point of view.
It may be objected that we have no right to argue from the geometric
to the arithmetic continuum, but this is not a case of a deduction from
postulates, but rather of a geometrical illustration used to defend the
reasonableness of a proposed postulate—a postulate that seems necessary
if the arithmetic continuum is to be a proper representation of the
geometric. In any case we cannot do without a "basis" of indefinables
as a foundation for our definitions, and why may we not at any time
add to that basis a new indefinable number, denoting it by a suitable
symbol, and ascribing to it a definite, though not completely stated,
.ordinal relation with the rational numbers ?
